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Abstract 
In drawing on recent advances in international and comparative political economy, this paper 
argues that diverging paths of institutional development among emerging market democracies 
are driven by the Transnational Integration Regimes (TIRs), in which a country is embedded. TIRs 
are more than trade agreements, aid projects, or harmonization systems and should be viewed as 
development programs. To date, research on the role of international factors shaping local instit-
utional development has done little to move beyond references to markets and hegemonic hier-
archies as the main mechanisms of change, compliance, and commitment. This work is largely 
based on a depoliticized view of institutional change, and overlooks the growing literature on the 
evolution  of  regulative  capitalism  and  the  diverse  patterns  of  transnationalizing  the  modern 
state. By integrating this latter work into our analysis, we show how TIRs differ less in terms of 
their incentives and largess and more in terms of their emphasis on building institutional ca-
pacities and ability to  merge  monitoring and learning at both  the  national and supranational 
levels. We develop a comparative framework to show these systematic differences through an 
analysis of the impact of the EU Accession Process on postcommunist countries and NAFTA on 
Mexico.  
 
Introduction 
 
This paper offers a framework for analyzing the ways in which transnational 
integration  regimes  shape  the  evolution  of  economic  institutions  in  emerging 
democracies,  and  in  turn  builds  on  the  growing  intersection  of  research  between 
international and comparative political economy. The work on globalization has shifted 
from a focus on individual economic and political variables to an emphasis on distinct 
regional  commercial,  military  or  geopolitical  arrangements  shaping  domestic 
institutions  (Dezalay  &  Garth  2002,  Djelic  &  Sahlin-Andersson  2006,  Pastor  2001). 
Scholars of development have increasingly shifted attention away from an emphasis on 
rapid market liberalization toward the role of state and non-state actors in building new 
institutions  to  help  stabilize,  legitimize,  and  regulate  domestic  economic  activity 
(Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2005; Majone, 1996; Rodrik et al., 2002). 
 
  However,  the  attempts  to  integrate  these  debates  tend  to  conclude  that  the 
optimal  mechanisms  for  influencing  domestic  institutional  change  take  the  forms  of 
either markets or externally acting hierarchies. On the one hand, development depends 
on  the  extent  to  which  current  and  capital  accounts  are  liberalized  so  that  powerful 
economic incentives can force state and non-state actors to continue down the path of 
reform and build the “right institutions.” On the other hand, students of international 
political economy often argue that reforms stick when robust external conditionality is 
backed by clear goals, strong incentives, and asymmetric power. In this view, cronyism 
is so rampant that market forces alone cannot be trusted to gain the commitment of 
elites in domestic countries. Taken to its limit, the “right” models of reform can only be 
consolidated when advanced nations take the backward ones into full receivership.
1 In-
deed, on the heels of Argentina’s historic collapse in 2001, some scholars even proposed 
that the UN take over the country and install a board of internationally known central 
bank governors to run economic policy (Caballero & Dornbusch 2002). 
 
  This  paper,  in  contrast,  argues  that  divergent  paths  of  domestic  institutional 
development are  products  largely of the Transnational  Integration  Regimes  (TIRs), in 
which they are embedded. TIRs are more than trade pacts, aid projects, or harmonization 
systems, as they increasingly offer developing countries normative models, resources, 
and integration mechanisms to engage in institutional change. In acting as development 
programs, TIRs differ not simply in terms of their incentives and largess but particularly 
in  terms  of  their  emphasis  on  institutional  capacities,  their  empowerment  of  diverse 
stakeholder  groups,  and  their  ability  to  merge  monitoring  and  learning  at  both  the 
national and supranational levels. In this view, the development problem is less about 
external actors finding the optimal incentive structure to impose a particular policy on 
an emerging democracy and more about the ways in which TIRs alter or reinforce ex-
                                                 
1This is  not immediately apparent as  scholars often  speak about  strong incentives and policy 
anchoring. But such incentive systems appear to work when the criteria are so clear that they are 
self-evident  and  the  penalties  are  so  strong  that  non-compliance  appears  impossible.  Hence, 
hierarchical power, akin to the traditional notion of international hegemony, appears to be the 
key solution for change. One can see this in how Amsden (2007) understands the imposition of 
international economic models and when Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier (2002, 2005) describe the 
force of EU incentives. See also Tovias & Ugur (2004). isting  roles  of  and  balance  of  power  among  the  state  and  domestic  stakeholders  to 
partake in new collective institutional experiments. 
 
  A key weakness in much of the research on the roles of domestic or international 
factors  in  development  is  its  reliance  on  the  depoliticization  approach  to  institution 
building. Regardless of whether one advocates the limited “market preserving state” or 
the  interventionist  “developmental  state,”  the  common  view  is  that  the  ideal 
international mechanisms are those that circumvent domestic politics and empower an 
insulated  change  team  to  impose  ideal  designs  on  society  (Stark  &  Bruszt  1998, 
McDermott  2002).  This  approach  overlooks  the  burgeoning  literature  showing  how 
economic development is underpinned by the gradual creation of complex institutions, 
in which public and private actors experiment with policies and coalitions to form the 
regulatory state or regulatory capitalism (Bruszt 2002a, Cohen & Sabel 1998, Levi-Faur 
2006). Introducing this concept of the experimental regulatory state into the equation 
changes the developmental game in three fundamental ways.  
 
First, at the domestic level, institution building is impeded less by state capture 
per  se  than  by  weaknesses  on  the  demand  and  supply  sides.  Demand  is  impeded 
because potential beneficiaries, dormant minority groups (Jacoby 2000, 2004), lack the 
resources and voice in shaping existing or new institutional domains. Supply is impeded 
because  states  lack  the  incentives,  resources,  skills  and  knowledge  needed  for 
institutional upgrading.  
 
Second, TIRs can alter or conserve the status quo of the demand and supply sides 
of domestic institutional change by the extent to which they empower a diverse set of 
stakeholder groups and focus attention on building institutional capacity. The reliance 
on  incentives  tends  to  favor  entrenched  groups  but  provides  few  new  resources  or 
participatory  channels  for  weaker  groups  (Collier  and  Handlin,  2005;  Karl,  2008; 
Schneider,  2004).  The  emphasis  on  empowering  a  variety  of  often  minority 
socioeconomic  groups  can  facilitate  alternative  institutional  experiments  and  create 
countervailing sources of power. TIRs also help to upgrade and strengthen the supply 
side by providing material and knowledge resources to build administrative and regu-
lative capacity. 
 
  Third, the emphasis on building regulatory  capacities  changes  not simply the 
resource commitments of  TIRs but especially the integration mechanisms for both the 
developing country and the TIR. Typically, integration and development are framed in 
terms  of  binary,  unidimensional  conditionality,  in  which  arms-length  incentives  and 
enforcement  are  used  to  achieve  a  well-defined  policy  outcome.  In  our  view, 
conditionality is a multidimensional iterative process, in which TIRs deliver resources via 
different types of mechanisms that merge monitoring and learning at both the country 
and  supranational  levels  (Sabel  &  Zeitlin  2007).  But  because  of  the  different  starting 
points of developing countries and the experimental process of institution building such 
mechanisms evolve, requiring the TIR to be self-adapting. That is, comparative analysis 
of  TIRs requires not simply identification of resource transfers and policy content but 
especially  how  the  mechanisms  evolve  over  time  to  transform  the  institutional 
foundations of the developing country and the TIR itself. 
 
  Our aim here is to identify the key mechanisms of integration, which capture the 
varying  impact  of  TIRs  on  the  institution-building  process  in  emerging  market democracies. We do so through a comparative analysis of the impact of EU Accession 
Process  on  postcommunist  countries  and  NAFTA  on  Mexico.  We  find  this  a  useful 
comparison  since it  helps control for  geography, several starting  conditions, and the 
active members of advanced countries in the TIR. Indeed, several leading Latin American 
countries  appeared  better  positioned  to  modernize,  given  their  deeper,  more  recent 
experience  with  market-based  economics  and  democratic  governance.  However,  the 
countries of East Central Europe find themselves on the leading edge of institutional 
development.  We  argue  that  the  relative  success  of  institution  building  in  the  post-
communist countries is related to the way the EU has experimented with a variety of 
monitoring and assistance mechanisms to improve the institution-building process of 
the aspiring member countries. These mechanisms become particularly effective as they 
force candidate countries to submit themselves to iterative external evaluation, invest in 
administrative upgrading, and incorporate a variety of public and private actors into the 
institution-building  process.  In  contrast,  Mexico  appears  as  a  laggard  because  of  the 
reliance  on  economic  incentives  and  lack  of  institutionalization  of  learning  and 
monitoring within the NAFTA framework. Notice here that for this view EU accession is 
no  longer  a  process  of  institutional  harmonization  but  rather  a  potentially  profound 
innovation in international development. 
 
  Section  I  reviews  some  of  the  basic  data  contrasting  the  economic  and 
institutional development of countries in East Europe and Latin America. In Section II 
we argue that the construction of institutional capacities is an experimental process in 
which  a  variety  of  public  and  private  actors  must  coordinate  their  resources  and 
information. Section III shows how this view helps one to clarify the key mechanisms of 
integration  --  the  linchpin  for  TIRs  in  providing  effective  guidance  for  domestic 
institutional development in emerging market democracies. In Section IV, we compare 
NAFTA and the EU accession process in terms of these mechanisms. In Section V, we 
illustrate the impact of these different sets of integration mechanisms on institutional 
development in Mexico and the new EU accession countries in general and via focused 
cases on the policy domains of food safety and regional development. 
 
I.  East Europe and Latin America Compared 
 
“I see no grounds for the future of Bulgaria, Hungary or Poland to be 
different from  that  of Argentina,  Brazil  or  Chile.” - Adam  Przeworski 
(1991: 23) 
 
In  noting  that  the  “East  becomes  South,”  Adam  Przeworski  highlights  the 
similarities between the liberalizing countries of Latin America and the postcommunist 
countries  of  East  Central  Europe,  including  “states  weak  as  organizations,  political 
parties  and  other  associations  that  are  ineffectual  in  representing  and  mobilizing, 
economies that are monopolistic, over-protected and over-regulated, agricultures that 
cannot feed their own people, public bureaucracies that are overgrown, welfare services 
that are fragmentary and rudimentary” (Przeworski 1991: 24) Moreover, given the slight 
advantages  Latin  American  countries  generally  had  over  their  East  European 
counterparts in terms of wealth and implementing market-liberalizing reforms by the 
early 1990s (see Figures 1 and 2, p. 25), one might have even thought that Przeworski 
was underestimating the South.  
 
  But virtually every available institutional indicator proves these views wrong – the  East,  particularly  those  countries  participating  in  the  EU  Accession  process,  has 
surpassed the South. In this section we review some of these data mainly to suggest that 
the development difference cannot be explained by domestic factors alone, but rather by 
regional effects. During the discussion we pay special attention to Mexico in comparison 
with postcommunist countries. 
 
  Although the two regions had similar income and technological starting points, 
the stark divergence in high technology exports has led analysts of Latin America, such 
as those in CEPAL (2003) and the World Bank (2005), to point to key weaknesses not only 
in economic policy but especially the institutional and regulatory foundations of these 
countries (see also Figure 3, p. 26). Figures 4a-c (pp. 26-27) report the trends in key areas 
of  institutional  and  regulatory  quality  using  the  World  Bank  governance  indicators 
constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007). Figures 5a and b (p. 28) take 
selected countries and plot the difference in their given score from that of average in 
their income group, as defined by the World Bank. This allows us to control for the 
effects of wealth endowments. 
 
The  data  reveal  three  notable  patterns.  First,  although  the  leading 
postcommunist  countries  do  not  have  dramatic  improvements,  they  do  tend  to 
outperform countries in their own income category and do not witness dramatic drops. 
In  contrast,  countries like  Mexico often  decline  over time and underperform in their 
income category. Second, another way to control for legacy biases is to  compare the 
evolution of countries that appear very similar at the start of the timeline. In this respect, 
countries like Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, some of the laggards in the region, are 
trending  upwards,  while  Mexico  and  other  South  American  countries  are  slipping, 
sometimes  dramatically. Third, the  data reveal that there is a growing divergence in 
governance indicators between different groups of East European countries. Countries 
of the former Soviet Union remain at the bottom of the ratings, while those participating 
in EU Accession remain stable or rise. The concern for some Latin American countries, 
especially  second-tier  countries  like  Venezuela,  Bolivia  and  Peru,  is  their  possible 
convergence with the laggards from the former Soviet Union. 
 
The capacity of the regulative state is also revealed when the strongest economic 
actors cannot set the rules for themselves but are constrained by rules and rights that are 
enforced by the state and can empower weaker actors. One of the most fundamental 
forms of regulation is the enforcement of rights for labor to organize, form associations, 
enter in collective dispute and make collective agreements. (Sunstein, 2000) and Mosley 
and Uno (2007) have done extensive comparative research on labor rights violations and 
protection. Figure 6 (p. 29) presents their aggregate scores that  measure thirty-seven 
potential violations of personal and collective labor rights.
2 In the countries with much 
lower  scores,  typically  the  strongest  economic  actors  can  rule  in  the  labor  market 
without  much  state  involvement.  The  graph  shows  a  clear  distinction  between  the 
performance of Latin American countries and Central East European (CEE) countries in 
this  regard.  State  capacity  to  prevent  excessive  forms  of  the  misuse  of  power 
                                                 
2Labor  rights  violations  range  from  incapacity  (or  unwillingness)  to  uphold  labor’s  right  to 
establish and join union and worker organizations, through murder or disappearance of union 
members  or  organizers  to  the  state  incapacity  to  uphold,  or  outright  state  action  to  prevent 
collective agreements. Overall points around 30 might be said to indicate the presence of public 
control over the rules of the game in the highly asymmetrical labor-business relations. asymmetries in the labor market are relatively strong (and close to the EU-15 averages) 
in the  CEE countries. Such state capacities are weak in the  Latin American countries, 
especially Mexico.  
 
In  sum,  the  data  suggest  that  there  are  diverging  patterns  between  distinct 
groups  of  countries  within  East  Europe  and  especially  between  those  countries 
participating in the EU accession process and those in Latin America. More pointedly, 
we  see  this  divergence  between  Mexico  and  those  leading  postcommunist  countries, 
despite similar starting points, despite more than fifteen years of pursuing ostensibly 
market-based  reforms,  and  despite  being  associated  in  the  two  leading  TIRs.  Our 
suggestion  that  TIRs  have  strongly  shaped  these  trends  is  an  increasingly  common 
finding among regional specialists. For instance, scholars tracking the impact of NAFTA 
on Mexico note that  NAFTA has done much to improve Mexican exports and foreign 
direct investment, but equally emphasize that it has done little to improve a wide range 
of  institutions  in  Mexico  from  education  to  innovation  to  labor  to  basic  economic 
regulation  (World  Bank  2003,  Studer  &  Wise  2007).  In  contrast,  the  Europeanization 
literature has shown how the EU accession process has transformed a wide range of 
institutions  in  East  Central  Europe,  despite  several  shortcomings  of  the  process 
(Sedelmeyer,  2006).  The  key  issue  for  development  scholars  is  identifying  the 
mechanisms of the TIRs that can be broadly applied to other regions. 
In the following section we present a framework for doing so, first clarifying how 
the domestic process of building the regulative state reframes one’s understanding of 
the  role  of  external  factors,  namely  the  mediating  role  TIRs  and  their  different 
mechanisms of integration. 
 
II.  Institution Building and External Factors 
 
IIa.  The  Limits  to  Incentives  and  Conditionality  –  Optimal  Designs  and 
Depoliticization 
 
The  search  for  optimal  incentives  and  enforcement  mechanisms  has  a  long 
tradition in explaining the varying influence of international programs or TIRs on the 
institutional development of emerging market democracies (Mansfield and Milner 1997). 
Scholars  of  political  economy  have  amply  noted  the  limits  of  purely  economic 
incentives, typically via capital and current account liberalization, in compelling state 
and non-state actors to broaden their time horizons and undertake the collective action 
for the consolidation of regulatory institutions. Instead they have increasingly stressed 
the role of political incentives and asymmetric power.  
 
  Students of externally induced institutional change have sought to articulate the 
role  of  political  factors  in  two  related  ways.  In  their  analysis  of  democratization  in 
twelve  developing  countries,  Levitsky  and  Way  (2006)  argue  that  institutional 
development  is  shaped  by  the  combination  of  a  country’s  economic,  social  and 
communication linkages with the advanced world and external political leverage – the 
strong  incentives  for  reforms  via  access  or  denial  of  key  benefits  from  advanced 
countries.  Slovakia  and  Mexico  finish  first  and  second  in  their  ranking,  since  both 
countries have relatively strong socioeconomic linkages with advanced countries. But 
only Slovakia, not Mexico, is subject to strong external leverage vis-à-vis possible denial 
of benefits gained from entering a TIR, in this case the EU. The Europeanization literature has further sought to articulate the role of leverage, arguing that sustained institutional 
change depends not simply on incentives but rather vigilantly enforced and meritocratic 
conditionality (Sedelmeir & Schimmelfennig 2005, Vachudova 2004). For instance, in her 
detailed analysis of the EU accession process, Vachudova (2004) argues conditionality is 
effective and has meritocratic demonstration effects when the external actor (e.g., TIR) 
uses clear detailed goals and builds the capacity to enforce compliance. At the limit, 
conditionality becomes so precise in its policy goals and consequences that the candidate 
country has no other option but to comply. This view was extended as well to proposed 
improvements in NAFTA (Hufbauer & Schott 2005, Pastor 2001, Studer & Wise 2007) 
 
  While  the  introduction  of  the  terms  “conditionality,”  “compliance”  and 
“commitment” into the debate helps focus analysis on the problems of adverse selection 
and  moral  hazard,  their  generic  use  undermines  both  market  and  hierarchical 
approaches  to  capturing  the  external  influences  on  domestic  institution  building.  As 
Easterly (2005) has shown in his forceful critique of Western aid programs, this search 
for optimal conditionality has three problematic assumptions. First, one assumes that 
external  actors  have  ex  ante  sufficient  information  about  which  types  of  institutional 
reforms  or  detailed  adjustments  need  to  be  achieved,  why  they  failed  and  what 
adjustments are needed. Second, one assumes that domestic actors have sufficient re-
sources,  knowledge  and  political  conditions  to  enact  requested  reforms.  Third,  one 
assumes that both external and domestic commitment to reforms is binary, whereas it is 
often incremental and iterative as the process of institutional change unfolds.  
 
  In  our  view,  the  current  approaches  can  not  overcome  these  problematic 
assumptions  because  of  a  mis-specification  of  the  institution-building  process  itself, 
namely taking as their starting point the “depoliticization approach” to reform. In this 
view, governments can and should insulate powerful reform teams from particularistic 
interests  and  impose  rapidly  on  society  a  well  defined  set  of  new  rules  and  high 
powered  economic  incentives  that  would  facilitate  transactions  and  spur  investment 
(McDermott, 2002, 2004). Regardless of whether one advocates external actors utilizing 
greater  trade  incentives,  policy  anchoring  or  hierarchical  conditionality,  the  common 
ground  is  that  the  farther  a  country  is  from  the  ideal  institutional  setting,  the  more 
imperative it is for external actors to defend domestic actors from themselves. Since the 
optimal rules and incentives are well known, there is little need for the participation of a 
variety of state and  non-state actors on further  adjustments  in the basic  institutional 
designs.  Indeed,  arrested  development  is  largely  due  to  particularistic  interests 
capturing the state and infecting the optimal designs.  
 
  However,  this  view  overlooks  the  burgeoning  literature  on  what  we  call 
experimental “regulative state” or “regulative capitalism,” which dramatically changes 
one’s understanding of the politics of the institution-building process and, in turn, the 
role of external forces. We now highlight how institution building is a process in which a 
variety of public and private actors can be empowered to coordinate and monitor one 
another’s efforts to enhance regulatory capacities. In turn,  TIRs play key roles not by 
helping institution building circumvent domestic politics, but rather by structuring the 
domestic political game via their integration mechanisms.  
 
IIb.   Regulative Capitalism and the Role of TIRs  
   Experimental  regulative  capitalism  has  two  important  characteristics.  First, 
modern societies are noted not simply for a limited state that enforces a set of rules to 
constrain opportunism (North & Weingast 1998, Boycko et al. 1995), but especially for 
their  broad  constellation  of  state-backed  institutions  that  enable  public  and  private 
actors  to  share  risk,  monitor  one  another  and  enhance  knowledge  diffusion.  For 
instance, the comparative literature on corporate governance and finance increasingly 
emphasizes how states in both developing and advanced countries create institutional 
capacities to both regulate transactions and redistribute risk to facilitate fundamental 
private-sector investments that would not otherwise be taken (Hall & Soskice 2001, Moss 
2002,  Pistor  2001).  From  Silicon  Valley  to  national  innovative  systems  to  export-led 
growth  models  for  developing  countries,  research  shows  how  innovative  capacities 
emerge  through  public-private  institutions  that  facilitate  knowledge  creation  and 
diffusion for both large and small firms (Doner et al 2005, Giuliani et al 2005, McDermott 
2007, Piore & Sabel 1994, Saxenian 1994). 
 
  Second,  the  experimental  nature  of  the  institution-building  process  itself 
demands both capacity creation and public-private coordination. As the developmental 
statist literature has well documented, sustained development is noted by the creation of 
state capacities in which the public actors have the skills and resources to provide and 
monitor collective goods, where firms and individuals, alone or via their associations, 
are too weak to do so (Evans, 1995; Evans and Rauch, 1999; Riaian, 2000). But because 
the  state  often  ex  ante  does  not  have  the  requisite  skills,  knowledge  or  resources, 
governments must often coordinate with a variety of stakeholder groups who together 
have complementary resources and information (Rodrik 2004, Tendler 1997). 
 
In this view, the politics of institution building is less about the insulation of the 
state and more about the reconfiguration of the public-private boundary that exploits 
the empowered participation of a variety of public and private actors in joint problem 
solving. Variety is vital not only to improve the types of information and resources to be 
recombined but also to limit malfeasance and especially self-dealing by past entrenched 
stakeholders (Bruszt 2002a, McDermott 2004, 2007, Sabel 1994, Schneider 2004, Stark & 
Bruszt  1998).  In  turn,  this  view  redefines  the  causes  of  arrested  institutional 
development  and  expands  the  notion  of  accountability.  First,  arrested  institutional 
development emerges from a low equilibrium trap in which state and non-state actors 
have neither the interest nor resources to explore new courses of experimentation. On 
the demand side, groups that might have an interest in building new institutional ca-
pacities often lack the resources and channels to gain the sustained attention of the state. 
Entrenched groups maintain the status quo not only because they profit from it but also 
because  there  are  no  encompassing  structures  to  facilitate  horizontal  ties  to  weaker 
groups, which can open new possibilities for experimentation and extend time horizons 
(Schneider 2004, Tendler 1997). On the supply side, states often lack what Michael Mann 
calls the “infrastructural capacities” – the relevant skills, resources, and knowledge – 
needed  for  coordinating  institutional  upgrading  –  be  it  for  the  development  of 
regulatory and compliance capacities, as in food safety, labor rights or prudential bank 
regulation, or for the development of innovative capacities, as in training services, R&D, 
and export promotion (Mann, 1984).  
 
Second, institutionalizing rule-based participation of a variety of public actors 
and  relevant  non-state  groups  into  particular  policy  networks,  governments  are engaging  in  what  has  been  called  “extended  accountability”  (Stark  and  Bruszt  1998, 
Ansell  2000).  Reflecting  pluralist  traditions,  state  executives  are  constrained  by  a 
multiplicity  of  autonomous  non-state  groups  competing  for  voice  and  participation 
(Hellman  1998,  Hanson  &  Ekiert  2003).  Reflecting  the  corporatist  tradition,  the  state 
empowers  relevant  groups  to  undertake  certain  public  responsibilities  and  also  uses 
rules of participation to build collaborative relationships (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). 
 
  In  this  view  of  institution  building,  TIRs  influence  the  supply  and  demand 
problems, in turn the problem-solving capabilities of developing countries, in three key 
ways.  First,  regardless  of  normative  models,  TIRs  vary  in  their  emphasis  on 
administrative and institutional capacity building in the target country, and in turn, the 
provision  of  resources  and  assistance  to  compensate  for  deficiencies  at  the  domestic 
level. Resource transfer is not simply an incentive but a strategic tool in institutional 
change and can come in a variety of forms.  
 
Second, TIRs vary in the ways that they empower a variety of public and private 
actors, not simply via resources but particularly enhancing their political and functional 
participation in institution-building efforts. TIRs can be more or less proactive not only in 
highlighting overlooked areas of institutional development, in turn giving credence to 
relevant  domestic  stakeholders,  but  also  in  facilitating  cross-border  professional  and 
policy networks among relevant state and non-state actors. 
 
  Third, TIRs vary in their own ability to coordinate and adapt as they attempt to 
merge monitoring and learning at both the supranational and national levels. While a 
TIR attempts to accelerate compliance and learning in a certain country, the TIR itself has 
to build the capacity to learn why a country is diverging from ex ante defined path and 
determine the degree to which it must alter its own monitoring, training and resource 
transfer strategies. In turn, integration is a process that potentially transforms national 
institutional capacities as well as the existing transnational regulatory framework itself.   
 
 
 
III.  Beyond Conditionality 
 
In this view of experimental regulatory capitalism, the traditional arms-length, 
binary  notion  of  conditionality  loses  analytical  meaning  because  of  the  incremental, 
interactive  process  underpinning  capacity  creation.  Rather,  TIRs  can  be  more  readily 
distinguished  by  four  integration  mechanisms  –  breadth  and  depth,  assistance, 
monitoring and coordination, which shape the institutional project and the ability of 
domestic actors to build it. Here we define these mechanisms and then discuss how the 
EU Accession Process and NAFTA vary in their influence on institutional development in 
the CEE countries and Mexico. 
 
Breadth  refers  to  the  different  institutional  criteria  that  the  regime  principals 
define as necessary for the participating countries to meet. They can be rather narrow, 
such as a few economic trade rules, or quite extensive, such as programs for other policy 
domains. Depth refers to the emphasis a TIR places on building institutional capacity 
instead of only a policy change. While some TIRs emphasize changes to certain laws, 
others emphasize the need for a constellation of institutions to adequately regulate the given policy domain, regardless of the letter of law.  
 
Assistance refers to the amount and type of resources and knowledge, be they 
financial, social or human resources, that the TIR offers the country in order to help the 
latter build the capacities necessary to undertake the mission at hand. Monitoring refers 
to the TIR’s capabilities of acquiring and processing two types of information. The first 
concerns the degree to which the country is meeting the requisite institutional criteria or 
benchmarks. The  second concerns why the country  may or may not be reaching the 
expected benchmark. The sources of problems can range from the technocratic to the 
political. 
 
Both assistance and monitoring can vary according to whether they are dyadic or 
multiplex. Dyadic refers to a single line of transmission between the principal and agent. 
Different types of information and resources can be transmitted in a dyadic linkage but 
virtually all communication and decision making lies between two actors, such as two 
governments or a multilateral agency and the target government. The two mechanisms 
are multiplex when a variety of public and private actors from both sides of the mission 
are  involved  in  capacity  building.  For  instance,  an  original  basic  agreement  can  be 
dyadic,  but  then  the  counterparts  empower  different  governmental  and  non-
governmental  actors  to  engage  each  for  an  extended  period  in  a  particular  policy 
domain. The key structural distinction is that in a multiplex context there is no single 
gatekeeper in the  developing country controlling resources, contacts and information 
about  the  given  policy  domain.  Moreover,  while  dyadic  and  multiplex  channels  are 
widely present,  TIRs  vary to the extent in which they  proactively  harness and  shape 
these channels.  
 
Coordination refers to the extent to which the TIR institutionalizes the sharing of 
information  and  joint  problem  solving  among  its  officials  across  different  policy 
domains  and  especially  between  those  who  lead  the  assistance  and  monitoring 
mechanisms  within  a  given  policy  domain.  For  instance,  even  if  criteria  are  non-
negotiable and inflexible, repeated information from assistance and monitoring about 
why the country is falling short in one domain can force deliberations within the TIR in 
several directions, such as revising the sequencing of steps within the domain, altering 
the type of assistance being delivered, or targeting resources toward particular groups 
better suited to undertake the given reform. 
 
Table 1 summarizes these mechanisms.  We argue that a  TIR  is  more likely to 
induce  sustained  institutional  development  not  simply  because  of  its  largess  or 
bargaining  power,  but  mainly  to  the  extent  it  a)  emphasizes  institutional  capacity 
building;  b)  invests  in  multiplex  assistance  and  monitoring  capabilities;  and  c) 
institutionalizes coordination in such a way so as to merge monitoring and learning.  
 
      Table 1. Mechanisms TIRs Employ for Domestic Institutional Development 
 
Mechanism  Substantive Issue  Form 
Breadth  Variety of policy and institutional 
domains 
1. Breadth & 
Depth 
Depth  Focus on policy vs. institutional capacity 
Dyadic  2. Assistance  Quantity and type of material 
and knowledge resources  Multiplex Dyadic  3. Monitoring  Information on compliance 
and reasons for shortcomings  Multiplex 
4. Coordination  The extent to which actors within the 3 above components regularly 
exchange information and reshape one another’s activities 
 
 
IV. Comparing EU Accession and NAFTA as Development Programs 
 
If a comparison between the EU Accession Process and NAFTA were limited to the 
former TIR’s budget, bargaining power and administrative size, then the lessons for the 
role of external actors in development may not be very portable to other contexts (Pastor 
2001, Struder &  Wise 2007). Scrutiny of development programs has also increasingly 
illustrated how reliance on incentives and hierarchy easily leads to wasted investment, a 
misuse of power and an undermining of local solutions to sustained institution building 
(Easterly  2005).  Hence,  comparing  these  two  TIRs  according  to  the  key  integration 
mechanisms  outlined  above  allows  one  to  identify  potential  sources  of  different 
development paths that can be applicable elsewhere. 
 
These differences were not evident in the early 1990s. Although NAFTA was created 
in 1994 with the US-Canada Trade Agreement as a template, it did intend to embed 
Mexico into the region in such ways as to advance democracy and marketization of the 
southern  partner.  Indeed,  NAFTA  would  establish  procedures  to  ensure  Mexican 
compliance  with  liberalized  trade,  investment,  labor  and  environmental  standards 
(Mattli 1998, Duina 2006). Through the mid-1990s the EU member states did not view 
the integration of postcommunist countries as vital nor did they envision the need for a 
new system to help these countries upgrade their institutions (Vachudova 2004, Jacoby 
2004). By the mid-1990s, even after the Copenhagen Conference, the EU saw the possible 
incorporation of postcommunist countries within the framework of harmonization and 
incentives. Only after observing backsliding in the East and great variation in meeting 
the  Copenhagen  criteria  did  the  EU  begin  adjusting  its  approach  toward  a  model 
focused on developing institutional capacities in a variety of policy domains. 
 
Breadth and Depth 
 
EU Accession remains unparalleled in these dimensions, as represented in the thirty-
one chapters and 80,000 pages of the acquis which each candidate country must satisfy. 
Candidate countries have to address policy changes in a broad range of political, social 
and  economic  domains  ranging  from  consumer  protection  to  corporate  governance, 
from  banking  regulation  to  state  aid  policies,  and  from  environmental  protection  to 
public procurement. But candidate countries were required not only to incorporate the 
already  extensive  Community  legislation  into  national  legislation,  but  even  more 
importantly, “to implement it properly in the field, via the appropriate administrative 
and judicial structures set up in the Member States and respected by companies.”
3 That 
is,  adoption  of  the  acquis  means  building  up  institutional  capacity  –  remaking  the 
administrative state and the way economic relations are regulated (Bruszt 2002b; Oren-
stein  et  al.  2008,  Vachudova  2004).  Compliance  in  all  thirty-one  chapters  is  a  non-
                                                 
3 See “Progress Reports and Enlargement Strategy Papers 1998-2003 of the European 
Commission”: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/key_documents/index_archive_en.htm 
 negotiable criterion for full membership, but compliance, as we will see, is often about 
ranking a country’s institutional capacity. 
 
In contrast, NAFTA for Mexico is much narrower and shallower, even in areas where 
additional measures were taken. NAFTA focuses mainly on economic and trade policy 
domains, with some attention to the environment and labor rights, as specified in post-
1994 agreements (the NAALC and NAEEC). NAFTA focuses on legal harmonization, with 
great  deference  to  a  country’s  own  interpretation  and  definition  (Duina  2007,  Pastor 
2001). That is, even in areas such as agriculture and phytosanitary regulation, where 
there are many regulatory and product definitions, NAFTA largely refers to standards in 
international trade agreements and sectoral federations as goals for harmonization. But 
the  de  facto  standards  for  Mexico  in  many  sectors  are  those  of  the  U.S.  regulatory 
agencies, which are the gatekeepers to the most important market. Hence there is not 
much institutional depth even when standards are clarified. While compliance is effec-
tively ex-post for Mexico, it can be an ongoing process with incentives to the extent that 
the NAFTA commission can authorize retroactive penalties, such as fines or temporary 
trade restrictions, for violations in trade, investment and labor standards. The use of ex 
ante  compliance  is  used  more  regularly  in  environmental  projects,  where  NAFTA 
provides assistance to Mexico.  
 
Assistance 
 
Assistance in EU accession is noteworthy for its large and varied resources as well its 
multiplex  channels  of  delivery  (Andonova  2004,  Jacoby  2004,  Vachudova  2004,  Sabel  & 
Zeitlin 2007). A summary of the main programs is provided in Table 2. Pre-accession 
assistance to the ten new member states from the CEE during 1990-2005 totaled about 28 
billion Euros (EU Commission 2006). Although programs are often criticized for waste 
and delays, observers have noted that staffing and budgets have been relatively low 
when compared to typical international aid benchmarks (Mayhew 1998, Peter 2000). Part 
of the reason appears to be the EU’s use of a variety of forms of assistance, including 
policy networks of non-state experts for on-site training, and its emphasis on triggering 
domestic  and  international  actors  to  partake  and  invest  in  institution  building.  For 
instance,  as  technocrats  in  Brussels  became  overwhelmed  with  requests,  the  EU 
launched the Twinnings program that teams existing and former policymakers from the 
West to work with their CEE counterparts on particular areas. The expansion of Twin-
nings and the decentralization of such programs as PHARE, ISPA, and Sapard were also 
proactive  attempts  by  the  EU  to  build  a  multiplex  structure  of  assistance,  as  CEE 
government and non-government actors engaged in joint problem-solving with a variety 
of similar counterparts from the West. (Bailey and Propris 2004) 
 
Assistance  in  NAFTA  is  demand  driven  but  notoriously  minimal  and  dyadic. 
Although the NAFTA commission is a standing body with oversight powers, it is mainly 
an intergovernmental forum. According to Duina’s (2007) estimates, the budget of the 
NAFTA  for  the  Secretariat,  NAALC  and  NAEEC  included,  is  only  $25  million.  Mexico 
largely relies on a trade and aid model, using the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank mainly for external assistance. Assistance from relevant ministries or 
secretaries  in  Canada  and  the  U.S.  is  on  an  ad  hoc  basis,  largely  as  part  of 
intergovernmental discussions to resolve a particular trade problem. While multiplexity 
can also come from voluntary collaboration between Mexican firms,  NGOs and social groups, on the one hand, and their counterparts in the U.S. and Canada, it is not part of 
NAFTA’s concerted approach, as it is in the EU. The only focused assistance comes in the 
domain of environmental policy and related infrastructure, as part of the NAEEC side 
agreement,  which  is  administered  by  the  Border  Environmental  Cooperation 
Commission (BECC), Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), and the North 
American Development Bank (NADB). These three entities help the NADB plan, evaluate 
and study environmental infrastructure projects, largely along the U.S.-Mexican border. 
Public or private actors can present projects and apply to the NADB for loans (Pastor 
2001, Hufbauer & Schott 2005). While some of the thirty-six projects to date have made 
significant advances for Mexico, the overall program is criticized for its lack of depth 
and funding. For instance, as of 2005, the  NADB has about $450 million in capital for 
making loans up to $2 billion. The World Bank estimates a need for $25 billion in annual 
infusions for ten years to modernize Mexico’s infrastructure. Moreover, the cost of the 
loans appears to be  inaccessible to Mexicans and  uncompetitive in the United  States 
(Studer 2007, pp. 61-62, World Bank 2005). 
 
Table 2. Summary of EU Pre-Accession Assistance Programs (Source: PHARE Brochure 0503) 
  
Program  Date  Countries  Financing  Goals 
PHARE I  1990  Poland, Hungary, 10 CEE  EBRD takes on 10 CEE 
in 1992-93 
Functioning Market 
Economy, Democratic 
institution building 
TAIEX 
 
1995  Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia  
Yearly 24 million 
Euros 
PHARE, Transition 
Facility 
Technical assistance for 
adopting legislation 
from acquis 
 
PHARE II  1998  All countries undergoing 
accession 
Approx. 1.6 billion 
Euro annually 
Capacity to implement 
acquis in 31 different 
policy areas  
Twinnings  1998  All  30 percent of PHARE 
funds set aside, 475 
projects from 98-01 
Institution-building 
through increased 
human capital and 
knowledge-sharing 
SAPARD  2000  All  Approx. 0.5 billion 
euro/yr 
Agricultural 
competitiveness, CAP 
ISPA (EC)  2000  All  Approx. 1 billion 
euro/yr 
Environmental and 
transport 
infrastructure 
 
Monitoring 
 
The  EU  Accession  Process  is  also  noteworthy  for  its  investment  into  robust  and 
varied  monitoring  capabilities  in  order  to  enhance  meritocracy,  accountability,  and 
efficient  use  of  funds  (Sabel  &  Zeitlin  2007,  Vachudova  2005).  Besides  evaluating 
whether a country was meeting the institutional criteria within a particular chapter or 
policy  domain,  EU  monitoring  focused  on  becoming  iterative  and  reflexive  as  well  as 
multiplex. Through the detailed Annual Reports on pre-accession progress and regular 
on-site  inspections,  external  actors  increasingly  married  accountability  with  problem 
solving. That is, evaluations were forward-looking, emphasizing what needs to be done 
rather  than  penalizing  permanently  the  candidate  for  previous  deficiencies.  By benchmarking a country’s progress, relative to its past and its neighbors, their aim was 
to update and modify both detailed criteria and the mode of implementation. The key 
issue was not simply non-negotiable compliance but rather encouraging and shaping 
local solutions to generate effective forms of regulatory screening and enforcement to 
meet  EU  standards.  In  studies  of  compliance  in  domains  as  varied  as  health  care, 
consumer  protection,  environmental  safety  and  regional  development,  scholars  note 
how the detailed criteria varied according to context and sequencing was adapted to 
ensure  that  a  foundation  of  institutional  capacity  was  being  built  (Andonova  2004, 
Jacoby 2004, Hughes et al 2004). 
 
As  with  assistance  programs,  monitoring  became  increasingly  and  purposefully 
multiplex, as the EU sought to ground institution building in a diverse transnational 
network of state and non-state actors. For each policy domain or acquis chapter, an EU 
unit worked with its counterpart in the candidate country to collect and process relevant 
information. Within each assistance program, bureaucrats, outside consultants and NGOs 
were  filing  progress  reports  based  on  their  visits  and  interactions  with  their 
counterparts. This may not be surprising, as the EU appears to  have established the 
concerted multiplex approach for many years when entering a new policy domain. For 
instance, Tarrant and Kelemen (2007) and Sabel and Zeitlin (2007) show that in several 
domains the EU provides strong support for the creation and mobilization of relevant 
non-state  organizations  to  act  as  both  channels  of  decentralized  information  and 
coalition builders for the diffusion and coherence of new standards. 
 
In contrast, monitoring in NAFTA is largely market driven and dyadic. National and 
subnational  governments  have  the  main  responsibility  to  regulate  the  standards  of 
goods traded and identify violations in trade rules. The NAFTA-level intergovernmental 
working groups, including those of the side agreements, monitor the activities of the 
national  and  subnational  agencies  via  annual  reports  to  the  Commission  about  their 
respective policy domains. These reports largely catalogue possible areas of dispute and 
trade  discrimination with  minimal attention to  problem  solving and identification of 
root  causes  (Mattli  1998,  Pastor  2001).  Private  actors  also  have  the  right  to  bring 
grievances to relevant NAFTA bodies. Agencies such as the BECC and the NADB screen 
and conduct ex-post monitoring of the particular programs they certify according to pre-
set, clear conditions.  
 
  As  Duina  notes,  however,  such  actions  are  rare  as  the  procedures  are 
cumbersome  and  the  intergovernmental  body  governing  NAFTA  seeks  to  prioritize 
sovereignty over forced harmonization (Duina, 2007). Moreover, monitoring is largely 
dyadic, as most of the ties into Mexico remain concentrated in the hands of the Ministry 
of Economy, which oversees all aspects of NAFTA administration.  
 
Coordination 
 
  Although problematic at times, coordination in the EU Accession Process was 
increasingly robust. As suggested above, as actors attempted to improve assistance and 
monitoring, they increasingly shared information across functional and policy domains. 
In addition to the Commission’s investment into a centralized, fully accessible database 
for all areas, the most obvious evidence for coordination comes from extensive research 
on the ways that EU actors have identified persistent problems in programs and sought to  revise  them  (Vachudova  2004,  Jacoby  2004,  Schimmelfennig,  &  Sedelmeier  2005, 
Bailey  and  Propris  2004,  Sabel  and  Zeitlin  2007).  The  diffusion  of  information  from 
different  resources  and  the  creation  of  cross  functional  working  groups  have  forced 
consultants and bureaucrats to reveal their respective actions and results and subject 
themselves to scrutiny from one another as well as from the candidate countries them-
selves, which are highly sensitive about being left behind and incorrectly compared with 
one  another.  In  turn,  programs  like  PHARE  and  Twinnings  not  only  have  been 
periodically revised but also implemented in a manner in which joint problem solving 
becomes  virtually  indistinguishable  from  compliance  detection.  Moreover,  the 
coordination among actors has helped the EU launch new, more focused programs, such 
as ISPA and SAPARD, to both relieve the administrative burden within existing programs 
and improve specialization in different policy domains. 
 
  Because  of  the  limited  forms  of  assistance  and  monitoring  and  their  dyadic 
structures, coordination is not strong in NAFTA (Hufbauer & Schott 2005, Studer & Wise 
2007).  Coordination  largely  takes  place  via  intergovernmental  work  groups,  but  the 
work  groups  themselves  have  limited  horizontal  ties.  The  NAALC  provides  for 
communication  between  national  labor  administrations,  but  this  is  largely  ad  hoc  as 
disputes arise. Moreover, triggering occurs only when the domestic labor unions press 
their NLA to look into a problem on the other side of the border. Coordination within the 
border environmental domain appears more actively in recent years, but this is limited 
to the BECC and representatives from the relevant national agencies. The most important 
initiatives, Border XXI and the 2012 program, focus on creating common metrics and 
means  to  monitor  compliance  by  businesses,  but  do  not  target  changes  in  Mexican 
institutional capacity at the national, state or municipal levels. We summarize the main 
differences between the EU accession process and NAFTA in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Comparing the Integration Mechanisms of EU Accession and NAFTA 
Mechanism  EU Accession  NAFTA 
Economic, Political, Institutional - Wide 
variety of policy domains 
Focus on economic and trade policies  1. Breadth & 
Depth 
Focus on administrative capacity; Ex ante 
compliance; detailed standards 
Focus on broad standards and harmoni-
zation; possible ex post sanctions; deference 
to national laws 
Large and various resources; move from 
pure demand driven to targeted missions, 
focus on institutional convergence  
Limited largely to environment, weak re-
sources; ad hoc requests to multilaterals 
and governments 
2. Assistance 
Increasingly decentralized and multiplex, 
resulting in extended public private and 
transnational networks 
Largely centralized and dyadic; use of ma-
rket and voluntary ties; environment 
becoming multiplex. 
Integrated compliance and problem-
solving; regular, intense scrutiny 
Ex-post compliance; annual centralized 
review; depends on market; Environment 
more frequent and problem-solving 
3. Monitoring 
Increasingly multiplex  Mainly dyadic, with exception of environ-
ment. 
 
4. Coordina-
tion 
Regular exchange of information and joint-
problem solving; reflexive and adaptive 
Commission administers; weak horizontal 
communication; greater coordination in 
environment 
 
V. The Integration Mechanisms Shaping Domestic Institutional Change 
 
We now show how differences between the sets of integration mechanisms shapes domestic  institution  building  and  the  upgrading  of  the  regulative  states  via  a 
comparison of the food safety policy domain in the two TIRs and a focused analysis of 
regional  development  programming  in  the  EU  accession  process.
4  We  start  with  a 
general  overview  of  the  mechanism  effecting  domestic  institutional  change  and  then 
proceed to case studies.  
 
 Most development programs are criticized not only for weak external monitoring 
but also for their lack of attention to harnessing the initiatives and political participation 
of  a  wide  range  of  relevant  actors  (Easterly  2005).  The  impact  of  the  integration 
mechanisms of the EU accession process and NAFTA are most different in this regard. 
The EU process alters demand for regulative change in the aspiring member countries in 
several different ways, while the emphasis on economic incentives and resolving trade 
disputes in NAFTA provide weak “bottom-up” pressure for changing the structure and 
substance of the regulative state. The differences in the integration mechanisms reveal 
these trends in four key ways. 
 
First, by investing in multiplex mechanisms of monitoring and assistance that linked 
economic  reforms  with  political  participation,  the  EU  helped  keep  domestic  voice 
constant. The references to the importance of labor rights within NAFTA, in contrast, are 
not  coupled  with  effective  monitoring  and  empowerment.  Closely  monitoring  the 
upholding of political rights and the rules of fair political competition, the EU stabilized, 
and in some cases, helped to increase the likelihood that governments took into account 
a greater diversity of interests  (Vachudova, 2005). Indeed, the  EU has recently  made 
explicit that a key lesson from problematic cases of institutional reform is the need for 
assistance programs to support more directly a variety of domestic groups demanding 
improved  administrative  and  regulative  capacities  (EU  Commission  DG-General 
Enlargement 2007). 
 
Second,  the  EU’s  relatively  strong  focus  on  building  administrative  capacity  in  a 
variety of domains above all and not simply rules adoption or imitation helped create an 
institutional foundation that could ensure future compliance and the empowerment of a 
variety  of  domestic  actors  to  gain  the  benefits  of  integration.  On  the  one  hand,  as 
candidate  countries  focused  on  strengthening  regulatory  institutions  and  created 
administrative units to evaluate and implement pre-accession projects, they have linked 
these new agencies to EU-wide agencies of rule making, monitoring and enforcement. In 
turn, parallel to  building  domestic administrative capacities, they have also built the 
capacity of the domestic state to say no to the most powerful economic interests and 
have opened opportunities for weaker groups to make legitimate demands for the types 
of rules to be enforced. For instance, Epstein (2008) and Jacoby (2004) have shown that in 
policy  domains as  diverse as agriculture and transportation, the introduction of  new 
standards and regulations helped trigger the mobilization of both state and non-state ac-
tors in the institution-building process that had previously been overlooked. In contrast, 
NAFTA’s  narrow  focus  on  trade  liberalization  and  honoring  the  domestic  regulative 
status  quo  (Duina  2007)  conserved  the  position  of  the  strongest  domestic  economic 
                                                 
4We do not enter here in the discussion of variation in the effects of EU conditionality across 
countries or policy domains. Here we just stress that EU is neither a homogeneous polity, nor a 
regime of homogenizing: its effects might vary by policy sector and these effects are mediated by 
diverse domestic conditions that might differ dramatically. actors (Studer & Wise 2007). Without a focus on building regulative capacities, trade 
liberalization  embeds  domestic  struggles  for  institutional  change  in  a  competitive 
market environment and constrains the room of the forces trying to make demands to 
increase the diversity of interest and considerations that should count in the making of 
the rules of the economy.  
 
On the other hand, as Andonova (2004) notes, the creation of “enabling institutions” 
initiated  by  the  state  with  EU  assistance  helped  a  variety  of  firms  to  incorporate 
international practices and participate in the market, while subnational government and 
non-government  actors  obtained  the  resources  and  training  to  implement  new 
community standards. In contrast, work on NAFTA in a broad scope of sectors has shown 
how the lack of public programs undermines the ability of most domestic firms to learn 
new skills and develop new capabilities. At the same time, many sectors are too poor 
and  fragmented  to  develop  sectoral  associations  to  fill  this  gap  or  pressure  the 
government to provide requisite resources. In turn, both manufacturing and agricultural 
firms often can not meet international standards to simply hook into international value 
chains,  let  alone  invest  in  capabilities  to  participate  in  more  value  added  activities 
(Lederman 2005, Hufbauer & Schott 2005, Pastor 2001). 
 
Third,  the  multiplex  nature  of  assistance  and  monitoring  empowered  previously 
marginalized  or  weaker  economic  and  social  groups.  By  requiring  compliance  in  a 
variety of policy domains and setting clear metrics for success, the EU has expanded the 
range  of  legitimate  demands  and  altered  the  structure  of  political  opportunities 
differentially  empowering  diverse  domestic  groups  (Börzel  and  Risse,  2000).  Besides 
altering  the  structure  of  political  opportunities,  multiplex  assistance  and  monitoring 
offered relatively weaker  stakeholder  groups a  diverse set of resources, contacts and 
information,  which  together  strengthened  their  abilities  to  participate  actively  in 
institution building, both before and after accession. Several of the assistance programs 
have directly targeted non-state actors and aimed at empowering subnational actors. For 
instance,  Buskova  and  Pleines  (2006)  show  that  EU  assistance  programs  aimed  at 
domestic  NGOs  have  helped  create  powerful  local  allies  in  the  upgrading  of 
environmental regulations. Jacoby (2004, 2008) argues that this “coalitional approach” to 
policy change is a concerted action on the part of the EU – directly and coordinated with 
non-state actors – to build transnational and domestic alliances to diffuse standards and 
to reinforce the variety of groups to participate in the institution-building process. The 
empowerment of a wide variety of stakeholder groups into policymaking not only can 
improve  accountability  through  multi-party  monitoring  but  also  can  improve 
institutional  experimentation  via  the  use  of  actors  that  have  better  knowledge  and 
resources for the given policy issue (McDermott 2007, Schneider 2004). 
 
The key issue here is that while NAFTA hopes multiplexity comes about via market 
incentives,  the  EU  accession  process  makes  a  concerted  effort  to  coordinate  and 
empower the development of multiple channels among state and non-state actors. The 
result  in  NAFTA  is  a  narrowing  of  actors,  resources  and  information  relevant  to 
transforming a given policy domain. Even when there are focused vehicles for dispute 
resolution or policy programs, as in the environment and labor, only those with existing 
strong economic and political resources can  participate with a focus on  blocking the 
advance of new entrants to the game, be they foreign or domestic. The “empowered 
multiplexity” of the EU undermines notions that the accession process is namely a game of hierarchy. The EU relies often on vibrant horizontal ties among state and non-state 
actors  to  improve  and  implement  standards  and  regulations  (Sabel  &  Zeitlin  2007, 
Tarrant & Kelemen 2007). Similarly, Jacoby (2004) and Andonova (2004), among others, 
have shown that the EU coordinates with transnational and domestic non-state actors to 
strengthen public-private networks within a target country and to improve all parties’ 
abilities to learn and monitor one another. 
 
Fourth, institution building became increasingly viewed as an experimental, iterative 
process, in which  CEE actors used new standards and by recombining and improving 
existing  capacities  (Jacoby  2004,  Sabel  &  Zeitlin  2007).  Just  as  the  EU  focused  on 
constantly  evaluating  its  own  programs,  so  too  did  the  CEE  countries  begin  to 
institutionalize  self-evaluation.  A  typical  example  is  the  requirement  by  the  EU  that 
candidate governments produce an annual National Accession Partnership report. These 
large reports detailed the progress to date in every policy domain, as well as clarified the 
steps  that  the  country  was  taking  to  fulfill  the  various  objectives.  In  turn,  the  given 
government was setting real time benchmarks for itself that both the candidate country 
and the EU would use to gauge commitment and new areas of focused assistance.  
 
In contrast, even where  NAFTA defines standards for market activities and goods, 
there is little detail about the role and composition of institutions related to the policy 
domain.  For  instance,  although  NAFTA  aims  to  provide  material  assistance  and 
coordinate  activities  between  U.S.  and  Mexican  agencies  in  border  environment 
programs, the focus  is on common monitoring  standards, rather than  harnessing the 
potential capacity  upgrading of government and  non-government actors (Studer and 
Wise 2007). Institutional formation would come mainly from the government’s interests 
in maintaining open market access to the U.S. and Canada as well as from the economic 
interests of firms – e.g., by directly building the infrastructure to implement standards 
and/or lobby the government to take the requisite action. Since the intergovernmental 
coordinating committees focus monitoring and negotiations on ways to avoid retaliatory 
trade measures, they become mainly forums for powerful interests to compete rather 
than collaborate with other parties. For instance, Hufbauer & Schott (2005) and Pastor 
(2001) detail how not only powerful corporations and sectoral interest groups are the 
main participants but also how they use both their market power and political leverage 
to use standards as a method to improve their market share or access and not a means to 
trigger upgrading. 
 
In what follows, we offer brief analyses of policy domains in the two regimes to 
illustrate the differences with respect to our framework above.  
 
Va. The Development of Food Safety Standards and Institutions 
 
The politics of agriculture in general and of food safety in particular, for developing 
countries, be they in East Europe or Latin America, has two common dynamics. On the 
one hand, the potential benefits of using product and process standards can often be 
undermined by turning standards simply into a disputed domain of trade barriers. On 
the other hand, the  domestic landscape is often marked by a  political and economic 
structural  imbalance  that  pits  a  few  resource-rich  firms  and  their  related  trade 
association  against  numerous,  fragmented  small  holders.  These  traits  were  clearly 
present in the cases of the new EU candidate countries and Mexico, as we will see below.  
Food Safety for EU Accession Countries 
 
Through  much  of  the  1990s,  the  CEE-5  and  the  EU  regularly  experienced  trade 
disputes over the trade of food products, causing both government and market actors to 
become  very  suspicious  of  the  use  of  food  safety  measures.  Hence,  as  the  accession 
process  became  more  clearly  defined,  the  EU  was  highly  concerned  with  the 
development of high quality food safety institutions in potential candidate countries and 
with avoiding a paralyzing political dispute. At the same time, the domestic political 
landscape of agriculture in most  CEE countries was greatly shaped by two important 
legacies.  The  industry  was  composed  of  privatized  large  farm  and  food  processing 
companies  and  numerous,  fragmented  small  firms  in  form  of  family  farms  and 
cooperatives. The historical lack of autonomous trade associations under communism 
permitted a distorted structure of interest group representation during the early 1990s, 
typically with the relatively few large firms forming a strong association with lobbying 
capabilities and most other firms residing in weak associations, if any (Gatzweiler et al. 
2002). 
 
By most accounts, the state of food safety was problematic in East Europe by the late 
1990s. Outside experts as well as EU officials noted several severe problems, including 
the  utter  lack  of  relevant  legislation,  weak  government  certification  and  monitoring 
institutions,  deficient  border  inspection  posts  and  information  systems,  as  well  as 
substandard practices all along the value chains. However, these same observers note 
that  by  2004-05,  most  of  these  problems  had  been  addressed.  For  instance, by  2004, 
PHARE deemed that only 8 percent of food processing establishments in the CEE-5 were 
subpar and subject to transition periods.
5 
 
For the sake of brevity, we illustrate how the mechanisms of integration for the EU 
accession process helped upgrade food safety in the case of the Czech Republic. As with 
other countries, the Czech Republic was required by the EU to address all the issue areas 
just mentioned as a condition of membership. The responsibility for overseeing these 
reforms  fell  to  the  EU’s  Agriculture  DG  and  increasingly  the  Health  and  Consumer 
Protection  DGs,  while  SAPARD  and  PHARE  gave  support  in  focused  assistance  and 
assessments.  These  organizational  units  simultaneously  launched  top-down  and 
bottom-up approaches that focused on the strengthening of government institutional 
capacity as well as on improving the practices of both firms and their trade associations.  
 
The top-down approach came in two parts. First, EU authorities provided resources 
and training to Czech government officials to establish four departments related to food 
safety within the Ministries of Agriculture and Health by 2002 (Dolezal & Janackova 
2005).  Teams  from  the  DGs  as  well  as  SAPARD  also  established  a  system  of  on-site 
inspections all along the value chain, from farms to food processing plants to border 
inspection  posts.  Second,  as  the  EU  authorities  gained  greater  confidence  in  the 
capacities of the Czech authorities, they reduced their direct inspections and firm-level 
training programs, leaving these in the hands of Czech agencies, while focusing on the 
practices of the Czech agencies themselves as well as border inspection posts. By the end 
                                                 
5We draw here on several sources. The relevant EU Reports on these countries can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/external/enlarge/publi/index_en.htm  .  See  also  Garcia-
Martinez et al. (2006), Gatzweiler et al. (2002), Mishev & Valcheva (2005), and Yakova (2005/06). of 2003, the EU and the Czech government had invested over 90 million Euros in the 
food safety and processes institutions and industry. 
 
Compliance, while generally inflexible, was not a purely all or nothing game. The 
EU developed measures both to identify problems and to move the client along. For 
instance, as government institutional deficiencies were identified, trade could be slowed 
by closing border posts, but then linked to further negotiations to clarify the terms of 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) funds. As late as 2002, PHARE found deficiencies in 
sixteen  border  inspection  posts, and  immediately launched a joint  program  with the 
Czech  authorities  to  improve  practices.  Food  processing  establishments  were  given 
three-year transition  periods to invest in the adequate systems and standards. In the 
meantime,  their  food  was  allowed  to  be  sold  in  domestic  markets,  given  different 
labeling in the EU markets, and in some cases completely shut out of the EU markets for 
the suspension period.  
 
Assistance came in two forms. PHARE II and SAPARD provided funds to the candidate 
countries  to  both  invest  in  new  agricultural  institutions  and  have  the  relevant 
agricultural  sectoral  associations  aid  their  member  firms  in  adopting  new  standards. 
TAIEX and Twinnings were reinforced to provide consultants and training programs for 
both  government personnel and firms (Bailey  & Propis 2004).  EU Reports  document 
numerous  cases  in  which  traditional  and  organic  farms,  milk  processors  and  meat 
processors upgraded their processes and products to meet new standards via training 
from local institutions and Twinnings as well as financial assistance from both EU and 
national  government  sources.  Hence,  the  EU  provided  ways  for  the  candidates  to 
improve their organizational capacities, adopt new infrastructure and systems and train 
people at various levels.  
 
These  assistance  and  monitoring  activities  highlight  the  characteristics  of 
coordination  and  multiplexity.  Coordination  at  multiple  levels  led  to  adaptation  in 
assistance programs and compliance paths. Relevant committees within the DGs, PHARE 
and  SAPARD  coordinated  their  monitoring  and  assistance  activities.  Through  regular 
visits and a centralized database, the EU actors inspected compliance from the level of 
slaughterhouse  to  the  border  inspection  posts  to  the  functioning  of  the  relevant 
ministries and agencies in the candidate countries. Part of the aforementioned overhaul 
of the Twinnings programs in 1998 included more defined assistance, such as in the use 
and implementation of ISO 9000 standards. Projects to improve communication systems 
within countries and with the EU were improved to better identify problem actors and 
areas. Transition periods for producers were combined with more focused training and 
CAP negotiations were tied into improvements with food safety. 
 
The  EU’s  concerted  effort  to  enhance  multiplexity  helped  empowering  diverse 
domestic interest groups and  increased the speed and  variety of  knowledge transfer 
grew  as  Twinnings  and  on-site  inspections  fostered  the  creation  of  communication 
channels  at  the  subnational  and  sectoral  levels.  A  good  example  of  this  process  is 
captured  in  Yakova’s  (2005/06)  detailed  study  of  the  transformation  of  Czech 
agricultural associations. By the late 1990s, the strongest association, economically and 
politically, was dominated by a few large food processing and producer firms. A few 
other  associations  were  weak,  largely  due  to  limited  resources  and  their  fragmented 
membership of small family farms and cooperatives. While the accession period drew the attention of these diverse firms and associations toward food safety issues, the larger 
firms were much better positioned to improve their capacities and meet new standards, 
as well as gain access to public resources. Yakova notes that, by 2004, although these 
associations were still actively competing with one another and at times in open political 
conflict,  even  the  weaker  ones  were  able  to  channel  resources  and  services  to  their 
members, influence government policy, and graft a focus on regional development and 
farmer support programs onto their rent-seeking tendencies. 
 
As Yakova  details, the  key component to this transformation was  not simply the 
presence of public resources or EU standards, but particularly the ways in which the 
accession process supported core EU country associations and non-government actors, 
such as the EU-wide  COPA-COGEC to help upgrade Czech firms and associations. For 
instance,  early  on,  PHARE  financed  conferences  and  forums  to  enable  representatives 
from EU and Czech associations to build professional ties. Although at the early stages 
there was little success for EU officials in transferring the EU model of interest-group 
organization  and  mediation,  these  efforts  did  result  in  strengthening  horizontal, 
transnational  networks  between  the  different  Czech  associations  and  their  EU 
counterparts. These relationships became the vehicles through which PHARE and Twin-
nings  channeled  upgrading  resources,  allowing  the  EU  associations  with  superior 
hands-on information and experience to establish regular programs to train the Czech 
associations  how  to  improve  their  organizational  capabilities,  influence  government 
policies and provide services to their members. In turn, as much as the agenda-setting 
nature  of  EU  accession  awoke  the  dormant  minorities,  the  coordinated  multiplex 
investment into transnational, non-government networks empowered and upgraded the 
capacities of these Czech groups as well as a diversity of interest-group representation.  
NAFTA, Mexico, and Food Safety 
 
NAFTA provided two major regulatory changes for Mexican food producers (Duina 
2007, Lederman 2005, Hubauer & Schott 2005). First, it phased out the antiquated form 
of government subsidies to producers and formally opened trade, with a ten-to-fifteen 
year phase-out of relevant barriers. Second, Article 722 defined a full set of international 
food  standards,  established  a  new  committee  on  Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary  matters 
(SPS), but kept regulatory authority largely in the hands of national actors.  
 
Given this overall architecture, the mechanisms of integration in this policy domain 
closely reflect the overall scheme of NAFTA that we outlined earlier. First, the criteria are 
rather narrowly defined and not deep. While the broader issues of agriculture focus on 
lowering  trade  barriers  and  strengthening  market  forces,  food  safety  focuses  on  the 
encouraged  use of  international standards but  no  discussion about  direct support or 
priorities  in  building  the  institutional  capacity  in,  i.e.,  Mexico  for  public  or  private 
actors. Second, monitoring and assistance reside mainly at the national levels. The SPS 
committee has constrained capacity and scope. It is comprised of two representatives 
from each country, has limited resources and, indeed, met only seven times between 
1994  and  1999  (Anderson  1999).  Its  main  role  is  to  act  as  an  intergovernmental 
coordinating body, focusing on reducing related trade barrier disputes. By default, the 
USDA,  because  of  market  size,  is  the  most  important  actor.  Third,  the  structure  of 
interaction  is  dyadic  –  regardless  of  the  level  of  prodding  by  the  SPS,  cross  border 
initiatives reside principally via negotiations between the federal agencies in Mexico and 
the U.S.  
Hence, the logic for upgrading in this domain is that Mexican public and private 
actors would have strong incentives from market forces and the enforced standards of 
the U.S. agencies to improve their practices at both the regulatory and firm levels. There 
have been four main consequences of the policies toward agriculture in general and food 
safety  in  particular.  First,  as  has  been  well  documented,  the  agricultural  industry  in 
Mexico  has  dramatically  increased  its  sales  to  the  U.S.  and  Canada  but  has  also 
witnessed a dramatic consolidation, with significant increases in rural unemployment 
and  poverty  (Lederman  2005,  Thompson  2007).  Although  the  Mexican  government 
enacted a limited rural support program, large domestic and foreign firms quickly came 
to dominate the sector. These were the  very actors that already had the  distribution 
systems and resources to organize proprietary value chains and invest in the need capa-
bilities, be they for improved efficiencies or quality control.  
 
Second,  the  ability  to  meet  new  food  safety  standards  was  haphazard  for  most 
producers, be they suppliers to large chains or direct distributors. The most significant 
evidence of this was the continued ban on many Mexican products through the 1990s 
and recurring violations (or at least accusations of violations) of USDA standards as late 
as  2002  –  from  health  problems  of  U.S.  consumers  eating  contaminated  Mexican 
strawberries  and  cantaloupe  to  concerns  about  pestilence  and  fungus  from  Mexican 
avocados,  limes and  mangos  (Alvarez 2006,  Calvin 2003, Stanford 2002). Part of this 
problem  was  due  to  the  strong  lobbying  efforts  by  U.S.  producers.  But  another  key 
reason was the lack of preparation on the part of the Mexican government not only to 
effectively monitor food safety practices but also to provide broad-based support for 
producers to meet the new standards. 
 
Third, the relevant agencies were clearly reactive and poorly coordinated. Mexican 
and  U.S.  officials  acted  largely  in  response  to  violations,  and  when  they  did  it  was 
dyadic  and  limited  in  scope.  For  instance,  in  reaction  to  violations,  few  subsequent 
programs  focused  on  research  and  detection  standards  over  a  short  period  of  time. 
Indeed,  the  U.S.  agencies  themselves  appeared  unprepared  for  cross-border  capacity 
building and diffusion. The FDA, for instance, does not have a mandate to have countries 
exporting to the U.S. mimic U.S. procedures, nor does it instruct a violating firm how to 
correct a problem (Calvin 2003). In turn, the forces of change in Mexico come from those 
with pre-existing strong economic and political resources.  
 
On the one hand, the efforts to use alternative channels to improve food safety have 
been  blocked  for  many  producers.  For  instance,  in  the  wake  of  the  strawberry 
contamination  in  1997,  the  California  Strawberry  Commission  created  a  Quality 
Assurance Food Safety program, but refused to allow the Mexican producers to partake 
in the commission or program. On the other hand, the largest firms, which monopolize 
most of the distribution links with U.S. firms, came to dominate support programs and 
standards  rule-making.  For  instance,  Alvarez  (2006)  has  documented  that  the  large 
majority of mango and lime producers could not meet U.S. standards not only because 
of cost constraints but also because the system that the U.S. officials wanted in place 
would cause a massive reorganization of the orchards and storing locations. Large firms 
came to dominate the certification process. They had the resources to implement the 
new protocols. And they were able to control the relevant associations responsible for 
implementing key areas of the regulations. For instance, although the USDA and Mexican government  helped  establish  EMEX,  an  organization  that  regulated  packing  sheds, 
provided assistance to packers and promoted exporters, as it became a non-state body, 
the  largest  exporter  gained  control  by  requiring  that  voting  be  proportional  to  the 
number  of  boxes  exported.  In  turn,  the  relatively  few  largest  exporters  adopted 
standards, rules of certification and support programs that served principally their own 
interests. 
 
Fourth, given the limited emphasis by  NAFTA on capacity building and the weak 
cross-border  coordination  mechanisms,  food  safety  has  become  a  domain  in  which 
resource are  directed toward trade  disputes. That is, rather than devoting economic, 
political and social capital toward creating institutions to help improve and implement 
standards,  public  and  private  actors  focus  discussing  standards  in  terms  of  trade 
conflict. Sometimes Mexican officials have success in gaining greater market access for 
their products, but the benefits tend to accrue to the largest firms (Hufbauer & Schott 
2005). 
 
A good example of these trends is in the case of the avocado producers from the 
Mexican state of Michoacán, which accounts for 80 percent of Mexican avocados and 
about 40 percent of the world’s avocados (Stanford 2002, Vogel 2000). Until 1996, the US 
allowed Mexican avocados to be sold only in Alaska, for fears of spreading fruit flies. 
U.S.  and  Mexican  officials  reacted  to  this  source  of  conflict  in  two  ways.  First,  U.S. 
agencies  collaborated  with  Mexican  federal  agencies  to  establish  a  limited  research 
programs to conduct field experiments and monitor certain farms. These efforts helped 
clarify  to  the  Mexicans  the  types  of  standards  and  practices  the  USDA  required  and 
educate the U.S. actors about the variety of producers that could be certified. Second, 
although growers had historically been quite fragmented and poorly organized, they 
created an association in the 1990s to support certification efforts and lobby the state and 
federal governments for new regulatory laws and institutions. These efforts extended to 
the U.S., namely gradually convincing the USDA to allowing limited exports of avocados 
under  strict  conditions.  However,  the  conditions  meant  that  only  1  percent  of  the 
estimated 6000 growers could meet these standards and enter the U.S. market in 1997. 
By 2000, this number grew to only 8 percent, but represented the largest, most powerful 
exporters. At the same time, as these exporters vastly increased the volume of avocados 
shipped to the U.S., the prices for avocados  dropped  dramatically.  In turn, although 
Mexican avocados have made inroads to the U.S. market, the large majority of producers 
have  little  power  in  the  new  association,  little  influence  in  the  U.S.  or  Mexican 
governments, fewer revenues to invest in the capabilities to meet the USDA standards. 
 
In  sum,  we  find  that  the  integration  mechanisms  of  NAFTA,  when  applied  to 
agriculture generally and food safety in particular, have allowed Mexico to increase its 
sales to the U.S., but have not been able to induce broad-based institutional upgrading – 
be it for regulation or supply-side support. In terms of our framework, there were few 
resources provided by NAFTA or the U.S. government to the Mexican government and 
few  channels  of  coordination  and  coalition  building.  On  the  demand  side,  the 
mechanisms allowed the most entrenched, powerful actors in Mexico to invest in new 
capabilities,  develop  international  trade  relations  and  lobby  government  officials  to 
improve their market access and regulatory needs. 
 
V.b. Regional developmental regimes in the new member countries  
The strengthening of regional development capacities epitomizes the ways in which 
the  EU  integration  mechanisms  creates  new  policy  fields  in  the  aspiring  member 
countries  and  also  the  conditions  of  sustained  institutional  change  by  way  of 
empowering a diversity of local actors and including them in a transnational multi-level 
governance regime.  
 
As  has  been  well  documented  (Hooghe  1996,  Ansell  2003),  the  EU’s  regional 
developmental policies, reformed in 1988, have aimed to reduce social and economic 
disparities  within  Europe  by  gradually  distributing  authority  toward  mainly  the 
supranational  and  subnational  levels  while  ensuring  coordination  with  national 
governments. To increase the likelihood that distributed authority would result in joint 
learning and monitoring, the creators of the new policies initiated programs that focused 
on upgrading the skills and capacities of regional/local level state and non-state actors. 
The principles of  disbursement made it  difficult for national governments to use the 
related  EU  funds in completely  hierarchical and centralized ways. Investing into the 
capacities of subnational state and non-state actors empowered them to participate ac-
tively in “bottom-up Europeanization.” 
 
The  introduction  of  territorial  developmental  institutions  in  the  CEE  countries 
constituted  a  de  novo  policy  field.  None  of  these  countries  had  explicit  regional 
developmental  policies  or  institutions.  Regional  economic  and  social  problems  were 
addressed, if at all, primarily through centralized and uncoordinated sectoral programs, 
which lacked the resources and skills to coordinate decentralized policymaking. There 
was limited demand side pressure from below, as most regions lacked elected councils, 
and  subnational  state  and  non-state  actors  were  weak  and  disorganized.  In  turn, 
regional development demanded the creation of new institutions with the knowledge 
and  coordination  capabilities  to  create  and  implement  integrated  developmental 
programs with thousands of projects meeting the strict criteria of getting access to the 
otherwise  non-negligible  EU  funds.6  Such  an  undertaking  had  several  components: 
create new administrative regions; build the capacity to provide statistical information 
and analysis at all levels; coordinate policy among relevant  national and subnational 
agencies; train bureaucrats at these different levels to design, implement and monitor 
developmental  programs;  build  a  network  of  decentralized  agencies  to  monitor  the 
management and implementation of developmental programs; create a diverse set of 
institutions to aid the generation of tens of thousands of projects that could fit in the 
framework of the developmental programs, meet the administrative criteria of the EU 
and increase regional “absorption capacity”; and develop a network of sectoral and re-
gional institutions for project quality pre-testing and evaluation.  
 
While  the  EU’s  Enlargement  DG  and  Regional  Policy  DG  oversaw  the  reforms, 
PHARE became a focused vehicle for supporting institution building. Relevant criteria 
were  developed  incrementally  and  iteratively,  as  EU  experts  and  then  local  actors 
trained by the EU created measures to identify problems and suggest ways of solving 
them.  Just  as  the  annual  comprehensive  progress  reports  of  the  Commission  were 
                                                 
6The Commission’s conditionality on the way of introducing “partnership” across the different 
levels of the state and between state and non-state actors was the “soft” part of the conditionality. 
On the other hand, issues of the administrative, management and monitoring capacities were 
non-negotiable (Hughes et al, 2005). complemented  by  domestic  ones,  the  general  problem-solving  reports  were 
complemented by dozens of commissioned studies focusing on the various details and 
specific aspects of transferring and implementing the EU rules.  
 
Similar to the process described in food safety, assistance and monitoring was both 
top down and bottom up to ensure a multiplex approach.  On the one  hand, the  EU 
provided templates and training to central governments to establish administrative units 
with the capacity to generate and coordinate national development plans and diverse 
sectoral programs as well as to evaluate the implementation of subnational development 
programs. As the Commission lacked the powers to enforce a particular institutional 
design, it had to adopt a differentiated approach relying on regular progress reports for 
cross-country comparisons. The Commission also used the knowledge generated on the 
ground  by  specialists  brought  to  the  CEEs  from  the  old  member  countries  via  the 
Twinnings  programs  and  by  domestic  agencies  with  personnel  trained  in  the  PHARE 
programs. It was one of the goals of assistance from very early on to help diversify and 
multiply sources of monitoring institutional change.. While the Commission was itself 
divided on the issue of what constitutes progress in administrative capacities, the EU 
gradually  developed  measures  to  identify  problems  and  suggest  solutions  that 
responded to practical experience.  
 
On  the  other  hand,  PHARE  and  Twinnings  helped  empower  diverse  sub-national 
actors  by  providing  them  with  information  and  skills  via  training  and  exchange 
programs  as  well  as  including  them  in  domestic  and  transnational  projects  with 
possibilities for intra-regional and cross-regional networking. The beneficiaries of the 
assistance  programs  included  associations  of  small  municipalities,  local  self-
governments, regional authorities, cross-border  alliances of  diverse subnational units, 
and  different  types  of  NGOs  ranging  from  environmental  organizations  to  NGOs 
specialized in reducing social and economic exclusion. In our survey of subnational de-
velopmental partnerships done in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, we found 
that  nearly  two-fifths  of  local  self-governments  and  more  than  one-fourth  of  NGOs 
participated  in  at  least  one  pre-accession  assistance  program.  The  scale  of  the  EU 
support  programs  set  aside  exclusively  for  NGO  capacity  building,  with  a  yearly  1-2 
million Euros per country, was rather modest in comparison to the resources provided 
to strengthening central governments’ administrative capacities. Nonetheless, a variety 
of PHARE programs supported different forms of developmental collaboration between 
local and subnational state and non-state actors. One of the goals of these programs was 
to enhance subnational actors’ abilities to influence the making and implementation of 
regional  developmental  policies.  In  our  aforementioned  survey,  we  found  that 
participation  in  EU  pre-accession  assistance  programs  was  the  strongest  predictor  of 
participation in  national and subnational developmental policies by subnational state 
and non-state actors in the post-accession period 
 
A side effect of these programs was increased  subregional “associativeness”– the 
creation  of  links  among  diverse  types  of  domestic  subnational  actors  and  the 
proliferation  of  ties  between  them  and  different  transnational  actors.  These  ties 
facilitated producing complex integrated projects, experimenting with new institutional 
forms, and lobbying for changes in goals or principles of developmental programs. For 
instance, in the Czech Republic, three regions were selected in the framework of a PHARE 
assistance program for the simulation of Regional Operational Programs (North West Bohemia,  Northern  Moravia  and  Central  Moravia).  In  Hungary  PHARE  experimented 
with programs to enable the government to include actors from the “statistical regions” 
in  policymaking.  PHARE  assisted  in  the  setting  up  of  some  of  the  first  Regional 
Developmental Agencies in Hungary and through PHARE the EU influenced the number 
and  shape  of  the  developmental  regions  as  well  as  their  organizational  structure 
(Hughes et al. 2004). In Poland the encompassing PHARE Economic and Social Cohesion 
Program (ESC) played a similar role.  
 
As assistance and monitoring became increasingly multiplex, domestic national and 
subnational actors learned how to use ties in the transnational multi-level governance 
system to acquire information, get support for solving specific problems and become 
participants in transnational policy alliances pressing for modifications in local regional 
policies. Regions and diverse associations of non-state actors, some of them created by 
pre-accession  EU  programs,  were  quick  to  open  official  representations  in  Brussels, 
participating in the creation of monitoring reports. Even in Hungary, one of the most 
centralized among the new members without elected regions, bottom-up developmental 
alliances were formed by municipalities and a variety of non-state actors. One of these 
alliances has already opened the first regional representation in Brussels, independent 
from  the  central  government. B y  2005,  when  preparations  for  the  2007-2013  plans 
started, the regional actors in the new member countries became vocal and successfully 
lobbied for decentralization of significant parts of regional development programming 
and implementation.  
 
Besides enabling subnational actors to use transnational alliances and the EU to as 
leverage over national level officials, the regional programs helped create domestic allies 
for the bottom up enforcement of the goals and principles of EU development policies 
and regulations. Rather than directly evaluate the details of tens of thousands of projects 
across the ten new member countries, the Commission has largely relied on the country 
reports and self-assessments of implementation. In particular, the EU relies on a diverse 
set of domestic actors to act as “watchdogs” and extend the accountability of domestic 
governments. (FERN 2000, Buskova & Pleines 2006) 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has attempted to offer a framework to compare the ways in which 
TIRs  shape  the  institutional  development  of  emerging  market  democracies  in 
constructing  the  modern  regulative  state.  As  the  evidence  presented  in  Section  I 
suggests, the divergent paths of development between Latin America and East Central 
Europe cannot be attributed solely to domestic factors. But rather than attributing this 
divergence  to  the  strength  of  market  incentives  or  hierarchical  conditionality,  our 
framework focused on four integration mechanisms of TIRs that can alter or conserve the 
supply and demand sides of institution building in the emerging market democracies. In 
doing  so,  we  also  aspired  to  introduce  concepts  that  could  be  incorporated  into 
development programs and TIRs beyond those affecting Mexico and the postcommunist 
countries. 
 
We  have  argued  that  the  postcommunist  countries  participating  in  the  EU 
Accession  Process  have  surpassed  Mexico  via  NAFTA  largely  because  of  the  ways  in 
which the EU has emphasized: a) the construction of institutional capacities in a variety 
of policy domains, instead of just policy outcomes; b) the multiplex nature of assistance and monitoring; and c) the investment into robust coordination among EU actors. The 
combination of these mechanisms has reshaped the supply side not only by affording 
governments access to diverse forms of knowledge and material resources but also by 
pushing  them  to  build  multi-level  state  capacities  that  can  resist  the  pressures  of 
powerful  entrenched  interests  and  open  policymaking  to  weaker  groups.  They  have 
reshaped the  demand side by empowering a  variety of state and non-state actors to 
participate in institutional building and recombine their resources. This was achieved 
not  only  through  the  vertical  transfer  of  resources  and  rights  but  also  through  the 
concerted creation of multiple social, economic and political linkages among domestic 
and foreign state and non-state actors.  In contrast,  NAFTA’s focus on a narrow set of 
policy  goals and reliance on incentives  derived  from economic and  political  markets 
tended to reinforce the relative power of entrenched elites, whose superior economic 
and political resources allowed them to shape regulations and institutions toward their 
narrow interests.  
 
Naturally  a  key  background  condition  becomes  the  commitment  to 
multidimensional integration made, at least in these cases, by the advanced countries. 
But one should qualify the use of commitment in much of the same way we understood 
the use of “conditionality.” External commitment is not a binary concept, but iterative 
and constructive, closely linked to the experimental, incremental process of  domestic 
institution building. The latter grows stronger as hurdles are overcome and progress 
made in the emerging democracy. Moreover, commitment from the “big brothers” is 
reinforced  by  the  combination  of  adaptability  and  accountability  in  the  TIR  they 
promote.  
 
The  relationship  between  evolving  notions  of  conditionality  and  commitment 
can be seen in two important ways. First, we have stressed the institutional innovations 
used  by  EU  in  the  governance  of  externally  induced  transformation  of  domestic 
institutions. Besides using high-powered incentives relying on markets and hierarchies, 
the experimental governance of transnational rule transfer within the EU nurtures and 
uses  networks  among  empowered  domestic  actors  both  to  detect  problems  in 
implementation and to increase the chances for the sustainability of institutional change. 
Instead  of  depoliticizing  institutional  change  and  instead  of  experimenting  with 
externally  imposed  “institutional  monocropping”  (Evans,  2004),  the  EU  invests  in 
building the capacities of domestic players both on the demand and supply sides, and it 
uses empowered domestic diversity to support transnational institutional convergence.  
 
Second, we have stressed the role played by a new form of “FDI” (Foreign Direct 
Involvement): the inclusion of a large diversity of external state and non-state actors in 
assisting  and  monitoring  domestic  institutional  change.  This  combination  of  direct 
involvement  of  supranational  actors  in  domestic  institution  building  with  enhancing 
capacities of domestic state and non-state actors is a new and still under-studied aspect 
of transnational economic development.  Figure 1. Comparison of GDP per Capita, 1990-2004 
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Figure 2. The South Liberalizes Faster than the East 
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Source: Cato Economic Freedom index  
 
Figure 3. Technology Change Accelerates in The East 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Central  Europe includes Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Hungary and  the  Czech  Republic. Latin 
America includes Mexico, Chile, Brazil and Argentina. Source: WDI online 
 
 
Figures 4a-c. Comparisons Governance and Institutional Quality, 1996-2006 
Figure 4a.  
Voice and Accountability
-1
-0,5
0
0,5
1
1,5
1996
1998
2000
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
LAT1
LAT2
Poland, Hungary,
Czech Republic,
Slovenia, Baltics
Belarus, Moldova,
Russia, Ukraine
Bulgaria,
Romania,
Slovakia
Mexico
 
NB:  LAT1  =  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  México,  Uruguay;  LAT2  =  Bolivia,  Colombia,  Ecuador, 
Paraguay, Venezuela, Peru. 
High Technology Exports as % of GDP 1994-2003
0.00%
1.00%
2.00%
3.00%
4.00%
5.00%
6.00%
7.00%
8.00%
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Year
E
x
p
o
r
t
s
Latin America
Eastern Europe 
Figure 4b. 
Government Effectiveness
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Figure 4c. 
Regulatory Quality
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Source for Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c: “Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996–2006,” Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007). 
Figure 5a. Regulation Quality & Gov’t Effectiveness – Distance from Income Group 
Mean 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5b. Control of Corruption & Rule of Law – Distance from Income Group Mean 
 
 
Source for Figures 5a and 5b: “Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996–2006,” 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007) 
 
  
 
Figure 6. Comparison of Labor Rights Institutions, 1995-2000 
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